对傅瑞慕“艾斯康迪多神学”的回应
麦可 霍顿
唐兴 摘要
A Response to John Frame's The Escondido Theology
Michael Horton
A Response to John Frame’s The Escondido Theology Feb.10, 2012 by Michael Horton in Book Review, General, Modern Reformation 约翰. 傅莱姆（John Frame）的新著《艾斯康迪多神学》[i]（The Escondido Theology
）对位于美国南加州艾斯康迪多郡（Escondido）之加州西敏斯特神学院（Westminster Seminary California
简称：WSC）的神学立场有诸多的批判和指控。曾受教于傅莱姆并且曾为同僚的麦克.霍顿（Michael
Horton），以该神学院的教授和受到批判的许多著作的作者身份，在《当代宗教改革》杂志（Modern
Reformation）上提出了回应。以下是中译摘要和注解： 首先，霍顿在回应中指出，傅莱姆多年之前从WSC离职的旧恩怨（old grudges），[ii] 似乎模糊了他的批判力，导致书中的指控要不是刻意的误导，就是松散的论证，甚至到了替（传扬成功福音的）约珥.欧斯丁（Joel Osteen）辩护的地步。这造成他过去一直为“福音派的重新和好”（evangelical reunion）辩护，[iii] 低调地处理传统改革宗神学的项目，往往责备那些严肃面对信仰宣言和教义人士，并且为文着墨批判改革宗阵营所推崇的学者威尔斯（David Wells）和慕勒（Richard Muller）。
至于神学立场的差异，霍顿认为，傅莱姆对圈内人的批判议题多是围绕在控诉对方的神学立场是属“路德宗”（Lutheran）的。这种对“路德宗”恐惧的历史渊源，根据霍顿的分析，乃出自于“大觉醒运动”（The
Great Awakening）中的“敬虔主义”（pietism）和“复兴主义”（revivalism）把美国更正教徒（American
Protestants）连结在一起，而认信（confessional）路德宗和改革宗往往乐於保持相对的孤立，自然形成同路伙伴之势。自从70年代费城西敏斯特神学院的“薛派争端”[iv]（Shepherd controversy）之后，改革宗阵营内某些（如同傅莱姆的）人士就开始尽力与路德宗保持距离，甚至不惜拥抱非改革宗的传统。这种以偏概全的神学立场，不但对路德宗不公平，也对那些认识到双方有许多重要共同点的改革宗人士更不公平。 其次，霍顿针对傅莱姆的批判提出了总结性的四项回应： 1）两个国度（Two Kingdoms）
首先，霍顿澄清WSC 对“两个国度”的议题没有任何正式的鉴定实验。葛德飞（Robert Godfrey）院长和许多教授都属凯博派（Kuperian）。凯博的“领域主权”（sphere sovereignty）[v]清楚地分辨教会的主权领域和基督徒的职业领域，在某些方面，比新-凯博派（neo-Kuyerian）还更接近路德宗。霍顿认为，改革宗神学认识到两个国度的区别而没有将二者分开，而傅莱姆似乎在强作错误的选项，怀疑任何作区分的论述，都是要把二者分开（他对律法和福音的论述也如此）。1997年WSC为反对提倡“一个国度”的“神权政体论”（Theonomy）[vi]出版了一本文集，其中也包括了傅莱姆的一篇文章；虽然他在文中意图把双方联合在一起，却没有称他当时的同僚为路德宗。 接着，霍顿进一步地说明了他的“两个国度”神学立场是承续加尔文和路德的“两个国度”教义，并叙述了其实际应用的细节：
…认识到新约教导我们，在这个世代要生活得像“客旅和寄居者，”藉着我们的呼召服事和爱我们的邻舍，向他们见证神的话，并且为城市共同的益处（重要，但非终极）提出贡献...教会要向世界宣讲神的话，包括福音和律法…正如加尔文提醒我们：“道德律法仅是被写在所有人良心里面的自然法。”
在所有的人中，基督徒最不应该在面对奴役、堕胎、种族歧视、剥削、不公平时，保持缄默无行动，没能管理神美好的创造。他们可以在这些呼召下与非基督徒一同行动，不应受到教会以神的话没有允许的某些特定的政策和议题，来约束他们的良心…自然法在内容上启示了神的公义、公平、大能和道德旨意——与神在基督里救赎的旨意（福音）有所区别。 霍顿认为傅莱姆所有的批判，在许多地方都模糊了这个重要的区别，若是否认合成，就被指控为未能兼顾二者。 另外，他指出傅莱姆在书中明白地说，他没有兴趣与WSC的教授范主能（David Van Drunen）[vii]或其他研究此议题的人士正面交手，仔细论述改革宗诠释此议题的历史。因为这样，才可以讽刺别人的观点，驳斥一个虚假的立场。 2）律法和福音（Law and Gospel）
霍顿认为，对于律法和福音之区别，傅莱姆似乎同意路德、加尔文和改革宗学者的看法，而所反对的是：“激进的律法-福音对立观”（radical
law-gospel antithesis）。傅莱姆定义二者的关系为：“福音包含了诫命；律法包含了恩典的应许。”霍顿的回应是：
他若是说，恩典之约包括了诸诫命（或是包括了要悔改和相信福音的诫命），谁还会有争议呢？但是这些要悔改和相信（顺服）福音的诫命不是福音，而是对福音正确的回应。他若是说，福音是藉着预表和影子赐给旧约圣徒的应许，谁会有争议呢？说福音的本身是律法，律法的本身是福音，是无法将二者连在一起的；反而会使二者成为同一件事。[viii] 霍顿指出，傅莱姆对律法-福音区分的混淆，导致他维护和赞同70年代模糊了律法-福音区分的“薛派争端”[ix]，以及后来的“盟约观”运动（Federal Vision）和“神权政体论”；这些都被保守改革宗视为是远离传统信仰宣言的教导。霍顿进一步地指明了其论证法的弱点：
约翰（傅莱姆的名字）用释经和对历史轻描淡写的评语，
批驳了一个无人持守的立场（至少WSC是如此），然后就抛弃了改革宗和路德神学所认为是基础和重要的区别。他对与历史上的争论比划脚力毫无兴趣，这是因为他拥抱了“某种类似私意解经主义（biblicism）”（的思维）。换言之，他对圣经的解释高过任何人对圣经的解释；他所相信的才是“合乎圣经的”，因此是“改革宗的”，即使他的解释与改革宗的共识相违背。 3）神的话在生活中应用（Application of God’s Word to All Life）
在这一段回应中，霍顿针对批判提出了三点反驳：首先，他奇怪傅莱姆竟然会批评传统改革宗神学把神的话应用在敬拜上的“规范性原则”（regulative principle），不把传讲神的话视为公开敬拜的主要元素。[x] 其次，对傅莱姆指控他在信徒个人生活或教会团体生活上，贬谪了的神的话，霍顿提出了他许多有关这些主题的著作，证明其指控是空穴来风。最后，霍顿认为最超过之处，在于傅莱姆误导了他对“律法第三功用”（the third use of the law）[xi] 的认知。
4）诠释（Translation）
另外一个傅莱姆曲解和误导了霍顿的论述，就是霍顿认为我们过于拼命取悦听众，不仅要把福音“诠释”（translating）得能使人了解，更要让人能接受。这不是能听懂，而令人爽口的问题。霍顿澄清他确认圣经需要被翻译成当地语言；我们必须清楚、有效地，从生活中引用比喻来传达信息。令霍顿费解的是，傅莱姆却不知从何处指控他认为只要读圣经，而不必解说。
霍顿进一步地说明其真正“诠释”的神学立场，是指出田立克（Paul Tillich）的“相互关联法”[xii]（method
of correlation）的错误，并且是要维护凯博和范泰尔（Van
Til）的观点，也包括了原型-复制的区别（archetypal-ectypal distinction）和人类知识的类比观（the
analogical view of human knowledge）。傅莱姆的指控，明显地倾向“范泰尔-克拉克辩论”[xiii]（Gordon Clark and Van Til debate）的克拉克一方（范泰尔曾是傅莱姆的老师）。
他在结论中指出，我们需要对这些重要的议题作辩论和讨论，因为大家往往会强调一些被模糊或被过分强调的论述。但是，在保守改革宗圈内的对话必须加以改善；否则，那些自相残杀的争吵和混淆，是会阻碍这个传统的伟大应许所追求的目标：“归正，永远向神的话归正”（Reformed
and always reforming according to the Word of God）。
译者注： [i]傅莱姆的部落格对这本书的介绍：“This
book is a critical analysis of a theological movement John Frame calls
The Escondido Theology. The name is chosen because this movement
developed mainly among faculty members of Westminster Seminary
California which is located in the city of Escondido, California. Some
members of this school of thought, such as Michael Horton, Meredith
Kline, and Darryl Hart, are well-known to students of Reformed theology.
But these figures have never before been discussed as composing a
distinctive school of thought. More often they have been discussed as
individual theologians, or simply as representatives of the orthodox
Reformed theological tradition. But they are not simply Reformed; they
hold views that are quite distinctive, unusual and controversial.
In Dr. Frame’s view, these positions are not standard Reformed
theology. None of their distinctive positions is taught in any of the
Reformed confessions. These positions are an idiosyncratic kind of
teaching peculiar to the Escondido school. Those who teach them are a
faction, even a sect. Taken in the plain sense of the terms, their
positions are all unbiblical. This new book by Dr. John Frame The Escondido Theology is
a needed corrective to the rapidly growing advocacy and acceptance of a
two-kingdom approach to theology and culture. It is not only timely,
considering the popularity of Two Kingdom Theology , but also because he
is the right individual to address the issues, having previously served
as a Professor at both Westminster in Philadelphia and then as a
founding faculty member at Escondido. Dr. Frame personally witnessed the
inception and development of this doctrinal view in Escondido. Dr.
Frame’s insight and analysis clearly represents the Reformed Christian
World and Life View because it is historically rooted in Calvinistic
theology.”(转载自：framepoythress.owrdpress.com)
WSC 院长葛德腓（Robert Godfrey）在Amazon.com的书评上作了这样的说明：“Perhaps the
simplest way to do that is to refer to the thirty-two bullet points with
which John has summarized our views at the beginning of the book (pp.
xxxvii-xxxix). He introduces these bullet points by claiming: "Below are
some assertions typical of, and widely accepted among, Escondido
theologians. Not all of them make all of these assertions, but all of
them regard them with some sympathy" (p,xxxvii). In response all of us
on the WSC faculty wish to state clearly that we reject all of these
thirty-two points as a fair or accurate presentation of our views. We
have the most sympathy with the bullet point which says "There is no
difference between being biblical and being Reformed" (p. xxxviii). Yet
we would state it differently: we are Reformed because we believe that
the Bible is most faithfully understood and taught in Reformed
Christianity. In relation to most of John's bullet points we believe and
teach the very opposite of what is attributed to us. We hope that those
interested in our work will read some of the many works written by our
faculty and see for themselves the inaccuracy of John's
book.”（摘录自：amazon.com） [ii] 参考傅莱姆早期以戏谑调侃的标题为文对WSC的晚辈改革宗人士所作的批判：《梅晨的童子军》（Machen’s
Warrior Children）“From 1923 to the present, the movement begun by J.
Gresham Machen and Westminster Theological Seminary has supplied the
theological leadership for the conservative evangelical Reformed
Christians in the United States. Under that leadership, conservative
Calvinists made a strong stand against liberal theology. But having lost
that theological battle in the Presbyterian Church, U. S. A., they
turned inward to battle among themselves about issues less important—in
some cases, far less important—than liberalism. This essay describes 21
of these issues, with some subdivisions, and offers some brief analysis
and evaluations. It concludes by raising some questions for the Reformed
community to consider: Was it right to devote so much of the church’s
time and effort to these theological battles? Did the disputants follow
biblical standards for resolution of these issues? Was the quality of
thought in these polemics worthy of the Reformed tradition of
scholarship? Should the Reformed community be willing to become more
inclusive, to tolerate greater theological differences than many of the
polemicists have wanted?”（摘录自：frame-poythress.org） [iii] 傅莱姆的“福音派的重新和好”（Evangelical Reunion）原文登载于：frame-poythress.org [iv] “薛派争端”的背景：“Norman
Shepherd (by all accounts a fine Christian man) taught at WTS east
following on from John Murray from 1963-1981. Controversial in his
articulation of reformed theology, in particular his view on covenant
and justification, he was embroiled in controversy from 1975-81 until
the board of WTS finally relieved him of his teaching position. Charges
then were filed against Mr Shepherd with his OPC Presbytery, however, Mr
Shepherd left the OPC and joined the Christian Reformed Church where he
is now a Minister Emeritus without these charges been pursued. The
implications of this controversy are still being felt to this day in
various Reformed denominations while many of the faculty of WTS still
remain sympathetic to Shepherd's teaching. Some controversial aspects
of Mr Shepherd's theology are his rejection of a covenant of Works and
the idea of merit, and as a consequence, the active obedience of Christ.
His insistence that election and therefore salvation be viewed from the
perspective of covenant as opposed to the eternal decrees of God and
his role of baptism as marking ones entry into the covenant of grace and
its benefits (which may be lost) have been well noted. However, it is
his view of justification by faith and works (non meritorious) that have
consistently caused concern and objection. Consequently, in 1981 many
notable Christian theologians and leaders including Roger Nicole, RC
Sproul, Martyn Lloyd-Jones, O Palmer Robertson, Robert Reymond, George
Knight III, W Stanford Reid, Morton Smith, Albert Martin, Robert
Godfrey, W Hendrickson and Meredith Kline among others sighed the
infamous 'letter of forty five' expressing concern over Norman
Shepherd's formulations (see below) that forced the board of WTS to act.
Hence, the Norman Shepherd controversy.”（转载自：pressiechurch.org） [v] Irving
Hexham 在《凯博的基督教政治观》（Christian Politics according to Abraham
Kuyper）中对凯博的“领域主权”观念作了这样的解释：“Here we find a brief, but dense outline of
Kuyper's political theory distilled from his great work, ons Programme
(Our Program, 1878). He argues that the determinative principle for
Calvinist political theory is "the Sovereignty of the Triune God over
the whole Cosmos" (p. 99). From this statement of principle he deduces
three realms of sovereignty; the State, Society and the Church. He then
refers to these realms or areas of relationship as integral wholes,
which he calls "spheres". In this way he speaks about his political
principle as the application of the principle of "sphere sovereignty" to
politics (p. 116).”（摘录自：people.ucalgary.ca） [vi] 傅莱姆对“神权政体”的定义：“Theonomy
can be defined simply as adherence to God's law, which would make all
Christians, especially Reformed Christians, into theonomists. Here I
define the term more narrowly as a school of thought within Reformed
theology which prefers literal, specific, and detailed applications of
Mosaic civil laws to modern civil government. The word "prefers" gives
us some leeway. At points, the theonomists, like the rest of us, apply
the law only in general and non-literal ways. But they tend more than
the rest of us to prefer the specific and the literal. John Frame from
Penultimate Thoughts on Theonomy”(摘录自：monergism.com) 另外，“神权政体”的定义（http://www.tenth.org/media/LOGLOM-2-Theonomy.pdf）： “A. Theonomy - (Gk., theos = God; nomos = law) a particular theory about the relation of the Law of Moses to
the New Covenant, emphasizing the abiding validity of the Torah’s
judicial/civil regulations for all nations and legal systems, often
requiring explicit biblical precedent for any law B. Christian Reconstructionism - a broader term emphasizing the positive project of transforming every aspect of culture, including politics and law, in order to bring it into submission to biblical principles
C. Dominion Theology - the emphasis here is on eschatology, esp. the
idea that the spread of Christ’s kingdom, in keeping with the Great
Commission, is the fulfillment of the “dominion mandate” given to Adam
and Eve, often coupled with post millennialism.” （摘录自：tenth.org） [vii]
范主能（David Van Drunen）是WSC 现任的系统神学教授，是研究“two kingdoms”
的主要人士，发表过许多文章和著作。在课堂上与学生对此课题往往有激烈的讨论（译者就该校读期间，曾有国内同学不赞成他的某些观点，争论之处多在于自然法（natural
law）的功用，以及应用上，如牧师教会以及个别的会众，二者在政治国度中的介入的范围和内容。傅莱姆对范主所著的《自然法的圣经案例》“A
Biblical Case for Natural
Law”作了评论（http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2010VanDrunen.htm）“To
repeat, I am convinced that there is such a thing as natural law. But I
am not at all convinced of Van Drunen’s (or anyone else’s) distinction
between religious and secular kingdoms, and I do not see any reason to
limit the use of Scripture to the religious kingdom as Van Drunen
suggests. Scripture is God’s word, and God’s word is the foundation of
morality. When we want to draw people, believers or unbelievers, to that
foundation, we should be unashamed to refer to Scripture. I grant that
there are many cultural forces telling us not to refer to Scripture in
the public square. But we should not listen to them. The attempt of Van
Drunen and others to convince us not to apply Scripture to civil matters
is a failure.[18]
I do not deny the importance of other distinctions that are
sometimes related to these. I am not saying, for example, that church
and state are identical. The distinction between these is evident: in
brief, the church does not bear the sword, and the state does not
administer the sacraments. Nor is there any need to turn our cultural
activities into churches, as by restricting our art to gospel tracts.
But good art will be art that recognizes the comprehensive lordship of
Jesus Christ. That doesn’t imply that there are distinctively Christian
and non-Christian brush strokes. It does imply that a Christian artist
should not be mistaken for a secular nihilist, or Muslim, or new-age
Monist. But given these distinctions, we should confess that culture is
Jesus’ culture. To paraphrase Kuyper, as Jesus looks at our culture, he
will always say, “Mine!!” But
the distinction between church and state, or Christ and culture, cannot
be helpfully understood by the two kingdoms scheme. Civil culture and
redemption are both under God’s sovereignty, and under the authority of
his infallible word. And natural
law itself is profoundly religious. That is perfectly evident from Rom.
1:18-32, arguably the fundamental text on natural law. There, natural
law gives a clear knowledge of God—not just morality, certainly not some
secular civil morality—but God himself. Natural law clearly reveals
God’s own nature and attributes (verse 20). It even leads to a personal
knowledge of God: not just knowing facts about him, but knowing him
(verse 20). The suppression of natural law leads to idolatry (21-25),
perhaps the most religious of all sins. That idolatry leads in turn to
sexual (26-27) and every other kind of sin (28-31). To call this
morality “secular” or “merely civil” profoundly misses its intent.
As a treatment of natural law itself, apart from the two-kingdoms
construction, Van Drunen’s book ignores the most important issues:
(a) The unbeliever’s suppression of the truth of natural law, which
Van Drunen mentions on p. 17 and then ignores through the rest of the
book. He never struggles with the problem of how natural law can
function as a practical standard of human life, when people inevitably
suppress the truth in unrighteousness.” (b) The difficulty of arguing ethical
issues from natural law. People often say that it is difficult to argue
ethical issues from Scripture in a society that does not honor
Scripture’s authority. But it is even more difficult to argue from
natural law. For natural law is not a written text. Even though it is
objectively valid, there is no way of gaining public agreement as to
what it says as long as we simply exchange opinions about what natural
law says. For example, when people argue from natural law that abortion
is wrong, they are essentially pitting their intuitions against the
intuitions of others (intuitions which, when true, are often
suppressed). Often such arguments are naturalistic fallacies, arguments
from “is” to “ought:’ e.g., unborn children are genetically unique
organisms, therefore we ought not to kill them. Arguments from Scripture
are not problematic in this way.
And (c), granted that supernatural revelation is compatible with
natural law in a two-kingdoms context, is there any sense in which
supernatural revelation, Scripture, is sufficient for God’s glory and for our faith and life? Van Drunen gives us no reason to think that it is.”
傅莱姆的这篇文章的确清楚地指出范主能对自然法理解的偏差，以及企图用领域（realm）的观念来界定“属灵的国度”(spiritual
kingdom) 和“世俗的国度”（secular
kingdom）的不同。傅莱姆认为这种企图出至于他承袭了Kline的观念把挪亚之约（Noachic
covenant）看为是普遍恩典的一种过分的解读。 [viii] 请参阅，傅莱姆的“福音与律法”（登录于守诚阁）。傅莱姆对其神学立场作了这样的说明：“我所反对的观点，即鲜明地区隔这两个信息，主要是来自路德宗的神学，虽然在加尔文和其他归正神学家那儿也能找到类似的声明。（注1）路德宗的“协和信条概略”（Epitome of Formula of Concord），第五章第5条承认，“福音”（gospel）这个字在圣经里有不同的用法，它引用马可福音1：15和使徒行传20：21来说明“正确的”福音的宣讲包括悔罪的吩咐。但是第6条作了一件非常奇怪的事。它说到：
但是如果把律法和福音放在一起比较，也把摩西（律法的教师）自己和基督（福音的教师）加以比较，我们相信、教导也承认，福音不是宣讲悔改、扎心知罪；适当来说（it
is properly），它不外乎最令人喜悦的信息和宣讲，充满了安慰，而不是定罪或恐吓，它安慰我们的良心，对抗律法的恐吓，并吩咐（bid）人唯独仰望基督的功德…… 我说这是很奇怪的，因为信条对此区分并没有给予任何的圣经支持，而这里所说的“福音”，与先前在第5条中所承认的是完全抵触的。第5条说是“正确的”，和第6条所说“适当的”是彼此矛盾的。第6条实际上是暗示，它所承认的圣经对福音的内容的描述，如马可福音1：15和使徒行传14：15，是“不恰当”的。（注2）马可福音1：15是正确的，但不是适当的。”以及，“神国度的权柄是祂的诫命的重述。当国度以权能出现，就是人悔改的时候。他们必须听从（hupakouo）福音（帖后一8；比较彼前四17的“信从”[apeitheo]）。福音本身要求某种的行为（徒十四15；加二14；腓一27；参罗二15）。 译者按：根据富来姆的这篇文章，他似乎并没有完全反对传统路德宗和加尔文对律法和福音所作的区分，他的重点在于“讲道”和“生活上的应用”，目的是要避免传讲“廉价的恩典”和“没有律法的福音”；而霍顿的重点在于“神学真理的清晰”。至于讲道和生活上的应用，WSC的确非常重视“律法-福音-律法”（law-gospel-law）的讲道原则，以及律法的三重功用。（译者曾就读于WSC）
因此看来，傅莱姆和霍顿神学争论的关键在于：福音中是否包含了律法，律法中是否包含了福音。傅莱姆说：“虽然我相信我们得救完全是靠神的恩典，而不是我们的工作，我却不相信他们是圣经里神所给的完全不同的信息，一个完全是命令（“律法”），另一个完全是应许（“福音”）。在圣经本身，命令通常不只是审判和宣告，而是神给我们的恩典的机会，让我们可以悔罪并信靠祂。如同使人所说，“求你…开恩将你的律法赐给我（诗一一九29）。”霍顿则认为，伴随着福音的诫命是对福音的回应（其意思是说：律法/诫命是伴随福音应许的；它们是人的责任，但更是神所应许的救赎作为，福音的本身就是要满足律法的要求，是藉着信心而非靠着行为）。 但是，当傅莱姆说：“命令通常不只是审判和宣告，而是神给我们的恩典的机会，让我们可以悔罪信靠祂。”（The commands, typically, are not merely announcements of judgment, but God’s gracious opportunities
to repent of sin and believe in
him.）即使我们可以理解这种说法，可能是从人的角度和普遍外在呼召的角度来看的；但是从律法与福音之关系的神学观点来看，用“机会”这个令人刺眼目的字眼，似乎有偏失的倾向和嫌疑，可能显露了其神学立场的瑕疵和分歧点，或者至少是神学用词的松散和失准。 在福音，就是恩典之约中，对蒙拣选的子民而言，神的律法和诫命不只是生活行为上的规范，而是要我们认识罪，把我们推向基督；能够完全遵行律法和诫命则是福音所应许的终极属天生命（我们现在虽不完全，但却是终极应许的预尝[foretaste]）。
保罗在加拉太书第三章中清楚地说明了得生命的两种不同的途径：靠行律法，或靠信福音。这是讲到律法和福音在救恩上的区分。律法和福音的相关处在于：完全满足律法而得生命的要求和标准，从来未改变过（工作之约、摩西之约和恩典之约），只因为亚当堕落后，全人类都失去完全满足律法要求的能力，而神差遣祂的儿子耶稣基督，末后的亚当和真以色列人，完全满足了律法的要求，才使得祂的子民能够藉着信心在神面前称义（满足律法的要求）得生命。在靠恩典和信心称义的基础上，律法被刻写在新的生命中，使得信徒愿意和有能力爱神的律法，过圣洁的生活，虽然有时会失败和不完全，但总是在福音中盼望终极的完全，因为福音应许了耶稣基督救赎之工在圣徒的身上必定成就。 傅莱姆的观点：“福音包含了律法；律法包含了福音”，对律法-福音的区分确实有模糊不清的嫌疑。 [ix] 参看注解iv [x] 傅莱姆对改革宗公众敬拜的“规范性原则”的立场是：“Let
it be clear from the outset that my "questions" about the Reformed
regulative principle for public worship do not spring from doubts about
what I take to be its main thrust. As for many years, I continue now to
be convinced that worship must be scriptural (i.e., consistent with
Scripture) and, indeed, limited by
Scripture. For who of us can say confidently how God wishes to be
worshiped except insofar as he has told us in Scripture? If there are
principles of worship to be found in nature, these cannot be understood
rightly except through the "spectacles" of Scripture; for when we try to
reason without Scripture, sin distorts our vision. And Scripture is
quick to condemn those who walk according to the "vain imaginations of
their own hearts" (Jer 3:17; 7:24; etc.)（转载自：reformed.org）
Still, it is one thing to affirm the sufficiency of Scripture for
worship, another thing to work out a cogent theological account of it.
And in trying to develop such an account, I have run into some questions
which either I am unable to answer correctly or which call for changes
in some traditional ways of understanding the principle. So I place them
on the table for discussion; I hope to learn from my readers.” [xi] 关于律法的第三功用，《基督教要义》第二卷，第七章，12节写到：“即使基督徒也需要律法。律法的第三大功用，也是律法的主要功用，这一功用与律法的正当目的有着紧密的联系。作为基督徒，上帝的灵已经在他们的心中掌权，但律法的第三大功用，与他们仍然大有关系。虽然他们心中有上帝的律法，上帝以其手指把他的律法刻在他们的心里，这就是说他们已经处在圣灵的引导和激励之下，有了顺服上帝的愿望。然而，上帝的律法仍然在两个方面对他们大有益处。律法是最好的工具，他们可以天天学习，由此认识上帝的旨意，而这正是他们所渴慕的。同时，上帝的律法也向他们证实他们是否明了上帝的旨意。这正如作仆人的一样，早已作好准备，一心想给主人留下好的印象，他所需要的就是细细查考主人的性情，以及行事为人的方式，目的是在于调整自己，予以适应。我们每个人都需要这样，因为到现在为止，还没有人臻达如此之高的智慧，以致于毋需天天接受律法的教训，在认识上帝的旨意方面，天天都有新的进步。而且，我们不仅需要教导，还需要告诫，而上帝的仆人从律法的这一益处就可大得帮助：通过经常默想上帝的律法，就激发起顺服之心，并在上帝的律法中得以坚固，从过犯罪恶的滑路上回转。在这条道路上，圣徒必需下定决心，继续前进；因为不管他们是如何火热地顺从圣灵的引导，努力趋向上帝的义，肉体的怠惰总是挤压他们，使他们无法以当有的敏捷前行。律法对肉体来说，就像鞭子对懒惰不动、畏缩不前的驴子，驱使它起来作工一样。即使一个属灵的人，他也没有完全摆脱肉体的重负，因此上帝的律法对他仍然是一个刺激，使他无法裹足不前…”（转载自：中国改革宗神学网站http://www.chinareformation.com/7-2-6.htm） [xii] 田立克的‘相互关联法’（method of correlation）也是一种‘存在的类比’为基础的。人通过对生存的分析提出存在的问题，问题的答案其实已经在问题中隐含了。理性对自身中的无限进行抽象的思考便能得出问题的答案。 [xiii] 傅莱姆对其老师范泰尔与克拉克的辩论作了这样的解释：“John Frame in his book, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,
says that Van Til and Gordon Clark had disagreements with each other
concerning the concept of God's incomprehensibility. Frame says on pages
21 and 22 of the above book, "Neither man was at his best in this
discussion; each seriously misunderstood each other, as we will see.
Both, however had valid concerns. Van Til wished to preserve the
Creator-creature distinction in the realm of knowledge, and Clark wished
to prevent any skeptical deductions from the doctrine of
incomprehensibility, to insist that we really do know God on the basis
of revelation. Van Til, therefore, insisted that even when God and man
were thinking of the same thing (a particular rose, for example), their
thoughts about it were never identical- God's were the thoughts of the
Creator, man's of the creature. Such language made Clark fear
skepticism. It seemed to him that if there was some discrepancy between
man's "This is a rose" and God's (concerning the same rose), then the
human assertion must somehow fall short of the truth, since the very
nature of truth is identical with God's mind. Thus if there is a
necessary discrepancy between God's mind and man's at every point, it
would seem that man could know nothing truly; skepticism would result.
Thus the discussion of incomprehensibility- essentially a doctrine about
the relation of man's thoughts to God's being- turned in this debate
more narrowly into a discussion of the relation between man's thoughts
and God's thoughts. To say that God is incomprehensible came to mean
that there is some discontinuity (much deeper in Van Til's view than in
Clark's) between our thoughts of God (and hence creation) and God's own
thoughts of himself (and of creation)." Van Til believed that our knowledge is qualitatively different from God. Clark believed that our knowledge is quantitatively different from God. Frame goes on to point out that there are some continuities and discontinuities between God's thoughts and ours. （摘录自：puritanboard.com）
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律法与福音
傅瑞慕
诚之译
Law and Gospel
John Frame
Law and Gospel
John M. Frame
诚之译自： http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2002Law.htm
译按：John
Frame 对“律法与福音”的定义，和威敏思特神学院的老师们的定义不同。这篇文章是2002年刊出的，已经看到他们当中的矛盾。所以，John
Frame最近出的一本批判加州威敏思特神学院的神学立场（Escondido theology）的书，
可以说是其来有自，冰冻三尺非一日之寒。在下一帖中我会贴出Horton对John Frame 的回应。）
在改革宗圈子里，这已经变得越来越普遍（在路德宗圈子里长久以来就是如此），即认为区分律法和福音是良好神学的关键，甚至有人说到，如果不同意对此区分的一些传统表述，就是否认了福音本身。
有时候这个论述会使用像罗马书3：21-31这样的经文，强调我们得救是靠神的恩典，唯独透过信心，与律法的行为完全无关。不过，我的看法是，争论这个问题的各方都未曾质疑称义是唯独靠恩典，唯独藉著信心，唯独靠基督归算的义。但区分信心和行为（工作）是一回事，区分律法和福音又是另一回事。
1. 传统的区分
律法和福音的差别，不等于虚假和真实的得救道路的差别。它其实是两种信息的差别，一个完全是由命令、威胁以及恐吓所组成，而另一个则是完全由应许和安慰所组成。虽然我相信我们得救完全是靠神的恩典，而不是我们的工作，我却不相信它们是圣经里神所给的完全不同的信息，一个完全是命令（“律法”），另一个完全是应许（“福音”）。在圣经本身，命令和应许通常是同时出现的。神的应许通常伴随着悔罪和相信神的应许的命令；而命令通常不只是审判的宣告，而是神给我们的恩典的机会，让我们可以悔罪并信靠祂。如同诗人所说，“求你……开恩将你的律法赐给我”（诗119：29）。
我所反对的观点，即鲜明地区隔这两个信息，主要是来自路德宗的神学，虽然在加尔文和其他归正神学家那儿也能找到类似的声明。（注1）路德宗的“协和信条概略”（Epitome of Formula of Concord），第五章第5条承认，“福音”（gospel）这个字在圣经里有不同的用法，它引用马可福音1：15和使徒行传20：21来说明“正确的”福音的宣讲包括悔罪的吩咐。但是第6条作了一件非常奇怪的事。它说到：
但是如果把律法和福音放在一起比较，也把摩西（律法的教师）自己和基督（福音的教师）加以比较，我们相信、教导也承认，福音不是宣讲悔改、扎心知罪；适当来说（it
is properly），它不外乎最令人喜悦的信息和宣讲，充满了安慰，而不是定罪或恐吓，它安慰我们的良心，对抗律法的恐吓，并吩咐（bid）人唯独仰望基督的功德……
我说这是很奇怪的，因为信条对此区分并没有给予任何的圣经支持，而这里所说的“福音”，与先前在第5条中所承认的是完全抵触的。第5条说是“正确的”，和第6条所说“适当的”是彼此矛盾的。第6条实际上是暗示，它所承认的圣经对福音的内容的描述，如马可福音1：15和使徒行传14：15，是“不恰当”的。（注2）马可福音1：15是正确的，但不是适当的。
2. 圣经中的律法和福音
有人告诉我，协和信条在这里所说的“适当”的意思，不是“不正确”或“错误”，而只是“更普通，或更平常”的意思。然而，我遍查了新约圣经中有关“福音”（euaggel）的字眼，却找不到一个例子，其上下文是把悔改的要求（即神的命令，律法）排除在福音的内容之外的。也就是说，我找不到一个例子是协和信条所说的福音的“适当”意义，纯粹安慰的信息，而不带有任何的义务。之所以没有出现这样的用法，是有很重要的神学理由的。
基本上，新约中的“福音”是神的国度已经在耶稣身上临到的好消息（太4：23，9：35；可1：14；路4：43；徒20：24）。（注3）“国度”是：(1) 神的权能；(2) 祂主权的权柄，以及(3) 祂进入历史打败撒但，并带来救恩及其全部的后果（注4）。神的国度包括祂在历史中所有的大能作为，特别包括了基督的复活。
神国度的权柄是祂的诫命的重述。当国度以权能出现，就是人悔改的时候。他们必须听从（hupakouo）福音（帖后1：8；比较彼前4：17的“信从”[apeitheo]）。福音本身要求某种的行为（徒14：15；加2：14；腓1：27；参罗2：15）。
当神进入历史，被造物就承受了祂的权能和权柄。祂以天国的权能设立和平。因此新约作者经常提到“和平的福音”（弗6：15；参照徒10：36；罗10：15），有时候提到神使外邦人和犹太人成为一个身体的这个“奥秘”（罗16：25；弗6：19）。
福音是这整个综合体：神拯救的能力，神的命令的一再复述，以及祂要进入历史执行祂的计划，这就是福音。知道神要让祂良善的计划开花结果，的确是好消息。
思考以赛亚书52：7，这是新约有关福音最重要的背景经文：
那报佳音，传平安，报好信，传救恩的，对锡安说：你的神作王了！这人的脚登山何等佳美！神的统治就是那好消息，这个会确保和平和救恩的消息。
即使要求人悔改也是好消息，因为在上下文中，它暗示神虽然在权能中降临来伸张祂的主权，也愿意为着基督的缘故而赦免人。
因此，福音就一个很重要的意义来说，包含了律法：神国度的权柄，祂对悔改的要求。即使对那些非常执着于律法/福音之区别的人来说，福音也包括了“相信”的命令，毕竟，“相信”也是命令；就类别而言，它是律法。而和十诫一样，这个律法对那些只想信赖自己的资源，而不信赖其他人的怜悯的人来说，也是非常骇人的。而且信心的命令也包括其他的要求：我先前提到的成就福音的行为。信心本身要靠爱来成全（加5：6），没有行为，它就是死的（雅2：17）。
信心本身，和其他任何人类行为一样，并不足够让任何人配得救恩。因此我们说到信心，并不是得救的基础（ground），而是得救的工具（instrument）。信心使人得救，不是因为它配得上救恩，而是因为它伸出双手，领受神在基督里的恩典。然而，信心是义务（责任），而就这个角度来说，吩咐人相信就和神其他的吩咐一样。因此我们不可能说这个吩咐，或律法，是排除在福音的信息之外的。
律法包含了福音，这也是真实的。神赐下律法作为圣约的一部分，而此圣约是神的恩典的礼物。十诫是这样开始的：“我是耶和华你的神，曾将你从埃及地为奴之家领出来。”神是在宣告祂拯救的恩典之后，才向以色列发布祂的命令的。因此，十诫作为一个整体，具有提供以色列一种新的生活方式的功能，是藉着恩典来赋予的（参照申命记7：7-8，9：4-6）。十诫是“律法”还是“福音”？当然它兼具二者。以色列听到十诫时感到害怕，这是必然的（出20：18-21）。但事实上它提供了祝福（6节）和应许（12节）。摩西和先知就足以让罪人免于在地狱中灭亡（太16：31）。
因此，显明地区隔律法和福音，在仔细的分析下是站不住脚的。如此，在律法和福音内，神都宣告了祂拯救的作为，祂也要求祂的百姓以顺服祂的吩咐来回应。“律法”和“福音”有各自的偏重，但它们是彼此重叠和交叉的。它们是从不同的视角呈现神整体的话语。的确，我们可以说圣经作为一个整体，同时是律法（因为整体来说，它以神的权柄说话，并要求人相信）和福音（因为整体来说，它对堕落的人类是好消息）。缺少了另一个视角，每个概念都是无意义的。每个概念都包含了彼此。
律法通常会带来恐惧，这是必然的。当神对罪的震怒展现在西乃山，以色列人感到惊吓（出20：18-21）。但它也为已经得赎的心带来喜悦（诗1：2；比较119：34-36，47，92，97，130，131；罗7：22）。同样，福音带来安慰和喜乐；但（在神学文献中较少提及的）它也带来定罪。保罗说他宣讲福音，对那些灭亡的人来说，“就作了死的香气叫他死”，而对那些相信的人来说，“就作了活的香气叫他活”（林后2：15-16；比较林前1：18，23，27-29；林后4：3-4；罗9：32）。福音对那些相信的人来说，是好消息。但是对那些想要靠自己的义拯救自己的人来说，是坏消息。它是神对他们的定罪，是冒犯人的石头。
3. 何者优先？ 在律法和福音的讨论中，我们常常会听到，很重要的不只是要宣讲律法和福音，也要先宣讲律法，然后再宣讲福音。我们被告知，人们必须先被律法所震慑，然后才会被驱使去寻求在基督里的救恩。当然，宣讲神的标准，人的顺服以及神对罪的震怒有很大的需要，特别是在我们这个时代，人们以为神会容许我们随心所欲，爱怎么样就怎么样。而当圣灵使他们扎心知罪，认识到他们违背了律法时，会驱使他们在悔改中下跪。
但是如我们所见，要呈现律法而不呈现福音，或福音而没有律法，真的是不可能的——虽然各种相对的强调还是可能的。而在这些相对的强调当中，圣经的模式倾向于把福音放在前头。正如我们所见，这是十诫的模式：神首先宣告祂已经拯救祂的百姓（福音），然后要求他们以祂的圣约子民的身份来行事为人（律法）。既然律法和福音都是神的圣约的面向，这个模式就遍布在圣经当中。
耶稣在祂的传道中反映了这个模式。在约翰福音第4章，耶稣告诉撒玛利亚妇人，祂会赐给她生命的活水，使她永远不渴。在祂提出这个礼物之后，才向她宣告律法，曝露她的奸淫。有些人会引用路加福音18：18-30作为相反的次序的例子：耶稣先阐述诫命，然后才告诉那富有的官跟随祂。但在这段经文中，耶稣并没有单单使用律法来恐吓此人，或让他陷入绝望当中。在耶稣呼召他作门体之后，那人的确失望地走了。这个呼召，本身虽然是命令，却是这段经文中的福音。
4. “保罗新观”和保罗的福音
在讨论福音的意义时，鉴于使徒保罗总是被带到最前线，这里应该要提到最近学术界提到的“保罗新观”“new
perspective on Paul”，这是根据Krister Stendahl，桑德斯（E. P. Sanders），James D.
G.
Dunn等人的著作。那个观点认为，根据保罗，犹太教的问题不是行为的义，而是它未能接受在基督里的新约，没有同时拥抱外邦人和犹太人。在这个观点下，保罗的福音不是为了回答某人受困扰的良心，无法满足神的要求，而是应验了神对亚伯拉罕要祝福万国的应许。保罗所反对的“律法的行为”，不是人满足神的道德律的尝试（译按：想靠行为称义），而是犹太人和外邦人的区别，例如割礼，饮食律和洁净律（译按：即在圣约之内的行为）。
关于这个新观点的讨论是非常复杂的，会牵涉到有关保罗那个时代巴勒斯坦犹太教的本质，保罗自己的历史，以及对一些关键经文的解释。我无法用一篇短论文来讨论这个争议。我的确同意那些人的看法，认为桑德斯在他使用的巴勒斯坦犹太教的参考资料时，是太过于挑剔的；我也相信新观未能有效地处理一些保罗的经文，例如罗4：4-5，11：6；弗2：8-10；腓3：9，这些经文都很清楚说明保罗反对的，不只是犹太人和外邦人之间的律法的阻隔，更是人们想靠自己的工作拯救自己的尝试。路德关于唯独恩典和唯独信心的教义，是完全符合圣经，完全符合保罗的。（注5）
但是新观很合理地警告我们，不要把保罗的福音简化为只是靠信心称义。保罗对犹太人的挑战是多方面的，他的福音也处理了许多不同的议题，如同我先前的讨论所暗指的。
5. 使用传统区分的合理性
如果有人为了特定的神学目的，要把福音作狭义的定义，我也不会强烈反对。圣经并没有给我们英文用法的词汇表。有一些技术性的神学用词，和圣经里类似的词的意义，并不完全等同。“重生”和“拣选”是其中的例子，“圣约”也是。（注6）只要这些定义不会在我们的读者当中制造混乱，我们可以随自己的意思来定义英文的语词。
一直以来，我们已经习惯把福音当作是和信心有关，而律法是和行为有关。在这种用法中，律法是定罪的，而福音是拯救人的。虽然这个用法和圣经对这些词的用法有所不同，在一些背景下，它的确是有用的。例如，我们都知道有一种讲道是只阐述道德的义务（即我们通常的看法：不可杀人，不可偷盗），而没有把他们要得救所需要的基督的知识传递给听众。我们通常把这种讲道（尤其是没有以其他的讲道强调来加以平衡时）描述为只是宣讲律法，是律法主义或道德主义的讲道。这是没有福音的讲道。因此，我们倾向于说，这不是在宣讲福音。所以，笼统来说，我们会区分律法式的讲道和福音式的讲道。我认为，这是协和信条最关心的：它提醒我们，讲道时两者都不可偏废。
当然，我们必须提醒自己，这会有另一个极端：宣讲“福音”到一个地步，暗示基督对我们的人生没有任何要求。我们称这种福音是“廉价恩典”（cheap
grace）或“轻信主义”（easy
believism）。我们也可以称此为宣讲“没有律法的福音”。它的极端是反律法主义，拒绝神的律法。传统的律法/福音的区别，本身不是反律法的，但是持守这种区分的人，对律法主义的危险的敏感，更甚于反律法主义的危险。
这种考量会引导我们以一种含糊的方式来区分宣讲律法和宣讲福音。当然，即使进行这种区分，我们的目的应该是要把它们合并在一起。所有的这些考虑都不要求我们作鲜明的区分。而当然，这个大致的区别不应该被用来让我们怀疑命令和应许的整合，这是遍布在圣经之内的。
很明显，以上描述的那种“律法主义者”的讲道，不是真正宣讲律法的讲道，也不是真正宣讲福音的讲道。因为正如我先前指出的，在圣经中，律法本身是包含在恩典之内临到我们的。
6. 律法/福音和基督徒生活
协和信条对律法和福音所作的区分，会对基督徒生活带来很不幸的后果。这份文件的确要求要对重生的人宣讲律法（注7），但仅止于威胁和恐吓，好驱使他们就近基督，见《概略》，第6章，第4条。这里完全没有律法是得赎者心中所喜悦的意思（诗1：2；比较119：34-36，47， 92，93，97，130，131；罗7：22）。
信条接着说信徒的确要在圣灵的影响下遵行律法，但仅止于此：
然而，圣灵的果子，是住在信徒心中的神的圣灵，在重生的人身上所作的工作，由重生之人所完成（自动且自由的），有如他们不知道命令、危险或奖赏；因为神的儿女是以这种方式活在律法中，也根据神的律法行事为人。这种生活的模式是圣保罗在他的书信中所说的，基督的律法和心志的律法（Law
of the mind），见罗7：25；8：7；8：2；加6：2。（《概略》，第6章，第5条）
所以， 律法可以威胁我们，驱使我们就近基督。但真正的好行为不是任何的命令、威胁或奖赏所驱动的。
依我看，这种教导是不合圣经的。它暗示说当你出于顺服神的命令、威胁或奖赏的影响来行事，在某种程度上就是被不义所污染，比真正的善工低一个档次。我同意说我们最好的工作也受到罪的污染，但当然不是这个理由。当圣经告诉我们一个命令，顺服这个命令就是义的行动。实在说，我们的义是由我们顺服神的命令来衡量的。当神以惩罚威胁我们，而当我们远离邪恶，作祂所要求的，那不是罪，而是正当的回应。当神应许给我们奖赏，我们拥抱这个奖赏就是件好事。
我们应当完全离开神的话的警告而行事的这个观念，是很可怕的观念。忽略神对祂的公义的启示，究其实，在根本上是有罪的。读过圣经，却拒绝让其命令影响我们的行为，是罪的本质。
那么，如果不是命令、威胁和圣经中奖赏的应许，究竟是什么驱使我们行善呢？信条没有说。它所暗示的是圣灵直接使我们打从内心来顺服。我相信圣灵的确是这样作的。但是协和信条似乎是假设圣灵的工作并不包括让人根据神的命令来决定采取行动。我认为这是错的。“宁静主义”（Quietism）的看法是基督徒要完全被动，等候神的圣灵在他们里面行事。这种基督徒生活的观点是不合圣经的。基督徒的生活是一场争战，一场赛跑。它需要抉择与努力。我不是说协和信条是宁静主义（路德宗人士在经过一些争辩后，拒绝了宁静主义），但是当我们阅读信条的立场时，宁静主义似乎就在它的转角不远。
7. 客观与主观
我相信，对基督徒生活持这种观点，其中的一个动机是认为一个人的生命必须根据客观的事实，而不是主观的看法。针对这个观点，我们的生活是建立在基督为我们所作的基础上，是历史上客观的事，而不是来自我们自己主观的看法或出于内心。因此，在这种观点下，福音是重述神为我们所完成的，而不是一种命令，以激起我们主观的回应。
这种理解是把焦点放在称义之上：神是为了基督的缘故，在客观上看我们是义的，而不是在我们里面有什么义。但是它倾向于忽略重生和成圣：神的确在被称义的人身上做工，产生真正主观的改变。
我对这种对称义的理解没有意见。但是在圣经中，虽然称义的根据是外在于我们的基督的工作，但是它是透过主观的信心来拥抱的；而信心是圣灵主观的重生的工作（约3：3）（注8）。因此，没有人是在主观上未被神的恩典改变，就在客观上被称义的。
因此，威敏思特信仰告白18.2，在说到得救的确据时，甚至不只提到神的应许这个真理（客观的），也提到“这些恩典的内在证据”以及“使人成为后嗣的圣灵的见证”——这些在一定程度上是主观的。事实上，我们无法分割客观和主观。客观的真理是由主观来领受的。我们不能拥有客观的知识、自信或确据，除非我们在主观上能领受神在客观上所赐给我们的。
8. 两个国度
我们也应该要提到有关基督与文化的“两个国度”的看法，这是汲取自律法和福音的鲜明区分（注9）。一般而言，这个观点认为有两个神的国度，其一，如同路德的说法，是神左手的国度，另一个是神右手的国度。前者是属世的，后者是神圣的。神以律法来统治前一个国度，而以神的话和圣灵来统治后一个国度。
问题是这两个国度的教义是宣称一种二分法（duality），不只是在律法和福音上，也是在神的标准，祂的规范（norm）上。有世俗的价值和宗教的价值，世俗的规范和宗教的规范。世俗社会只对自然律（natural
laws）——即在自然界中所能发现的道德——负责。因此，Gene
Veith说，“道德不是宗教的事务。”（注10）教会只臣服于福音之下，但从一个次要的角度来看（如同我们在上面看到的），教会也应臣服在律法和福音，神的话全部的内容下。因此，虽然基督徒可以参与到一般的文化当中，他不应该试图去使它基督化，让它变成一个基督教的文化。没有基督教文化这种事；只有世俗文化，和基督教会。当然，我们也不应该试图把世俗的标准带到教会里，例如，世俗的音乐。（注11）
的确，我们不应该藉著世俗的权力强迫未重生的人变成基督徒。教会没有佩剑的能力。然而，公民社会不存在两种神的规范，只有一种，即圣经里的规范。道德是宗教所最强调的。未重生的人透过自然启示，对神的律法有一定的知识（罗1：32），但信徒透过圣经的镜片会看得更清楚。圣经对公民政府的看法，并未要求我们强迫不信的人在所有的方面都像基督徒有同样的举止，但是它的确呼召我们在某些领域节制他们（及我们！）的罪。我们应该在社会中积极推广这些属神的标准。（注12）
总结
把律法和福音作鲜明的区分，在改革宗圈子和路德宗圈子里，是越来越普遍了。这是加州威敏思特神学院，现代宗教改革杂志，和白马客栈广播节目的看法。这些机构的领袖很坚持说他们的看法是圣经对这个问题的唯一看法。最近有人宣称，如果有人有不同的看法，就是与宗教改革分道扬镳，甚至否认福音本身。对这种看法，我们必须按协和信条所称的“适当的”意义，来使用福音这个词，而不是按圣经的观点。我相信我们应该坚持圣经的看法，反对这种传统。
[1] Lutheran
theologians, however, frequently complain that Reformed theology
“confuses” law and gospel, which is in the Lutheran view a grave error.
The main difference is that for the Reformed law is not merely an
accuser, but also a message of divine comfort, a delight of the redeemed
heart (Psm. 1:2). Also, the Reformed generally do not give the
law/gospel distinction as much prominence within their systematic
theological formulations. And, historically, they have been more open to
the broader biblical language which the Lutheran Formula of Concord calls “correct” but not “proper” (see below).
[2] The passage cited by the formula, Acts 20:21, does not use the euaggello root, the usual term for “gospel” and “gospel preaching,” but the termdiamarturomai.
But Acts 20:21 is nevertheless significant, since it gives a general
description of what Paul did in his preaching to “both Jews and Greeks.”
That preaching was certainly gospel preaching. Paul resolved in his
preaching to “know nothing but Christ and him crucified.” Luke 24:47 is
also significant, for it includes both repentance and forgiveness of
sins as the content Jesus gives his disciples to preach (kerusso) to all nations.
[3] N. T. Wright believes that this use of gospel has
a double root: “On the one hand, the gospel Paul preached was the
fulfilment of the message of Isaiah 40 and 52, the message of comfort
for Israel and of hope for the whole world, because YHWH, the god
of Israel, was returning to Zion to judge and redeem. on the other hand,
in the context into which Paul was speaking, "gospel" would mean the
celebration of the accession, or birth, of a king or emperor. Though no
doubt petty kingdoms might use the word for themselves, in Paul's world
the main ‘gospel’ was the news of, or the celebration of, Caesar,”
“Paul’s Gospel and Caesar’s Empire,” available at
http://www.ctinquiry.org/publications/wright.htm. Of course both of
these uses focus on the ruleof God as Lord, and both involve what is traditionally called law.
[4] This a triad of the sort expounded in my Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Phillipsburg: P&R Publications, 1987), Doctrine of God(forthcoming from the same publisher in 2002) and elsewhere.
[5] Although I am critical of the general stance of the Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals and their publication Modern Reformation on
this issue, I would strongly recommend Kim Riddlebarger’s essay,
“Reformed Confessionalism and the ‘New Perspective’ on Paul,” available
at the Alliance web site, www.alliancenet.org, as an excellent introduction to this discussion. I fully endorse the conclusions of that article.
[6] The
phrases “covenant of works” and “covenant of grace” found in the
Westminster Confession of Faith, 7.2-4 are not found anywhere in
Scripture. Covenant in Scripture refers to particular
historical relationships between God and his people, mediated by Noah,
Abraham, Moses, David, and Jesus. “Covenant of grace” generalizes the
common features of these historical covenants, seeing them as successive
manifestations of God’s redemptive Lordship. “Covenant of works” finds
in God’s relation to our first parents features identical to his later
covenants with, of course, significant differences.
[7] Theological
literature speaks of three “uses of the law” : (1) to restrain sin in
society, (2) to terrorize people in order to drive them to Christ, and
(3) as a guide to believers. In Lutheranism (not in Reformed circles)
there has been controversy over the third use, though the Formula affirms
it. But in Lutheranism, it is often said that “the law always accuses.”
So the third use is essentially the second use directed at believers,
driving us to Christ again and again and away from our residual
unbelief. Reformed writers do not deny our continual need for Christ and
the importance of hearing again and again that we are saved only by his
grace. But in Reformed theology, the law also plays a more direct role,
giving us specific guidance in God’s delightful paths.
[8] So, again, saving faith works through love (Gal. 5:6) and is dead without works (James 2:14-26).
[9] See, for example, Gene Veith, “Christianity and Culture: God’s Double Sovereignty,” from The Whirlpool (Jan.-Feb., 1997), available at www.alliancenet.org.
[10] Ibid.
[11] There
are, of course, reasons to criticize the use of secular music in the
church other than the two-kingdoms concept. But if that concept is
rejected, then the distinction between sacred and secular is relativized
somewhat, and one must evaluate “secular” music piece-by-piece, rather
than as a general category.
[12] In terms of the categories of H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture (NY: Harper, 1951), we should be “transformationalists,” not “dualists.”
书评：范主能著《自然法的圣经案例》
傅莱姆
Review of David Van Drunen,
A Biblical Case for Natural Law
John Frame
Natural law as a concept in ethics goes back to ancient
Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotelian and Stoic. These
philosophers believed that there are natural laws, moral principles that
can be discovered in nature (particularly human nature) by reason and
conscience. Of course, Aristotle and the Stoics were not concerned about
the role of Scripture in ethics. But early, medieval, and Reformation
Christians, seeking to integrate Greek philosophy with the Bible, asked
how natural law and Scripture are related in our ethical decisions. The
problem became especially pointed in Protestant theology, which argued
not only for the authority of Scripture, but also for the sufficiency of Scripture, orsola scriptura. If Scripture is sufficient for human life (indeed sufficient for God’s own glory[1]), what place remains for natural law?
Van Drunen in this book asks, what does the Bible say about natural
law? He assumes the authority of Scripture and seeks to ascertain
whether Scripture affirms natural law and what Scripture says about it.
Strangely, however, I couldn’t find any discussion in the book of the
important question of the sufficiency of Scripture. So far as I can tell, the only reference to sola scriptura in
the volume is in the Introduction by Stephen Grabill, who says that the
doctrine has been “badly caricatured” (ii). Neither Grabill nor Van
Drunen indicates how the doctrine has been caricatured, or how it should
be properly understood. This is odd, since Grabill begins by citing
negatively the common argument that “sola scriptura and
the Roman Catholic teaching on natural law are fundamentally opposed”
(i). one would think that at the very least this book would attempt to
show how those two doctrines should not be opposed, which is evidently
Van Drunen’s view. But so far as I can tell, the book does not do that
in any clear way. Van Drunen does discuss biblical examples affirming
natural law and incorporating natural law into biblical theology. But
these discussions, as we shall see, aggravate the problem rather than
resolving it.
Some readers will be surprised to learn that I accept Van Drunen’s argument for the existence of
natural law. Our disagreements concern the relation of natural law to
Scripture, the two-kingdoms doctrine, and the function of natural law
within a biblical ethical epistemology.
Much of Van Drunen’s
book is taken up, not with natural law as such, but with the “two
kingdoms” view of Christ and culture, which Van Drunen advocates. He
thinks that the functions of natural law can be best described within
that scheme. I think the two kingdoms doctrine is the weakest part of
the book. But I shall discuss that later in the review. For now, I will
begin where Van Drunen does.
Natural Law and God’s Image
In the Introduction, Van Drunen defines natural law as
the moral order inscribed in the world and especially in human
nature, an order that is known to all people through their natural
faculties (especially reason and/or conscience) even apart from
supernatural divine revelation that binds morally the whole human race.
(1)[2]
“Apart from” is a vague ｅxpression. I would reject it if Van Drunen had said that natural law can be rightly used apart from Scripture. But I agree that natural law can be knownapart from Scripture. According to Rom. 1 natural law[3] is known by people who do not have access to supernatural revelation.
In Chapter 2, Van Drunen expounds the biblical teaching that God is a
righteous king and that human beings, made in God’s image, reflect
God’s righteousness. We too are kings (Gen. 1:26), and so we are created
with a moral character (Eph. 4:24, Col. 3:10). Van Drunen jumps too
quickly, however, from this premise to the conclusion that we have a
natural law within ourselves. He says:
Thus, human nature at
the beginning was one of righteousness and holiness, of knowledge of God
and himself, of a moral commission to rule over creation in a way
imitating God’s rule. The image of God carried along with it a natural
law, a law inherent to human nature and directing human beings to
fulfill their royal commission in righteousness and holiness. (14)
If this means that the image of God in Adam motivated him toward
righteousness and holiness, I have no difficulty. But if it means that
this image instructed Adam as to what God wanted him to do, I think more
argument is needed. And the reference to “natural law” is legitimate
only on the second alternative.
In Gen. 1-3, it is clear that Adam’s moral character was not sufficient to
tell him God’s will. Adam received direction from supernatural divine
words directed to him, telling him his general responsibility to fill
and subdue the earth (Gen. 1:28), indicating the sources of his food
(verses 29-30), forbidding him to take the fruit of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil (2:16-17), convicting him and Eve of sin
following the fall (3:9-13) and pronouncing curses, mixed with blessings
(3:14-19). In the following narratives, there is a regular pattern of
divine words and human responses (in obedience or disobedience).
This is not to deny that human beings gain some knowledge from their created nature. I would not claim that all of
Adam’s moral knowledge came from outside himself. For example, God told
Adam to be fruitful and multiply. Gen. 1:28 may abbreviate what God
actually said to him. But I doubt that God gave him an encyclopedic
account of the mechanism of human reproduction. There were certain
things that Adam just knew, knowledge that God had created within him
and/or enabled him to find out on his own. Similarly, when God commanded
Adam to abstain from the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and
evil, Adam presumably understood what tree God was talking about, the
difference between fruit and leaves, and what actions constituted
“eating.” Adam knew, in other words, how to apply God’s
commands to his own specific decisions. At that specific level, his
conscience informed him of what acts were righteous or unrighteous.
And certainly Adam understood his own status as the image of God and
the dignity connected with it. He understood from the beginning that
other human beings should be treated with honor.
My problem,
therefore, is not with Van Drunen’s assertion that the human conscience
provides us with moral knowledge. It is rather with Van Drunen’s
omission of any significant role for God’s supernatural commands
informing his conscience.[4] God
designed us to gain moral knowledge, not by either supernatural or
natural revelation alone, but by an organic combination of the two, in
which by reason and conscience we apply God’s supernatural revelation to
our lives. Van Drunen entirely ignores the dialogue between God’s
speech and man’s response that serves as the essential framework of the
biblical story.
Natural Law and the Fall
on page 14, Van Drunen begins to discuss the Fall of Adam and its
effects on human moral knowledge. He rightly notes that according to
Rom. 1 people suppress their natural knowledge of morality and thus
“turn their natural knowledge of moral excellence into vile degeneracy”
(15). What can stop this course of corruption? Van Drunen here refers to
“the absolute necessity of special, biblical revelation for knowing the
way of salvation from sin offered in Christ…”
But he also
insists that despite this distortion of our ethical knowledge, natural
law still has a legitimate role to play. He seeks to show “that natural
law continues to exist in the fallen world; that man still knows it,
though in a corrupted fashion; and that it continues to have positive
usefulness today” (16). I agree for the most part with his argument
here.[5] I
agree that fallen people, according to Rom. 1, continue to bear God’s
image and that they continue to know the natural law, which removes all
excuses for sin (17). And I liked Van Drunen’s argument for the
traditional interpretation of Rom. 2:14-15, that it speaks of the
continuance of natural law in the hearts of Gentiles, rather than of
saving grace in the hearts of Gentile Christians (18-22). The second
interpretation is the choice of a number of modern interpreters, but I
think Van Drunen is right.
But I think it remarkable that Van
Drunen says nothing more in the book about the unbeliever’s suppression
of the truth. Certainly that complicates the role of natural law in
providing moral knowledge to human beings. If there is a natural law,
but man completely suppresses it, then it does not serve as a guide at
all. Evidently the suppression is not absolute, because the passage says
that natural law serves as an adequate means of removing excuses. So
there is a dynamic relation between true understanding and suppression
of that truth. To understand the unbeliever’s moral conscience, we must
understand not only his exposure to natural law, but also the paradox of
his recognizing it while rebelling against it. Van Drunen seems to be
entirely unaware of this complication.
Natural Law and the Secular Kingdom
My disagreements with the book become more severe in Chapter 3,
“Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms Doctrine.” Van Drunen’s basic position
is that natural law is God’s law for “civil” matters, and supernatural
revelation is his law for “spiritual” matters. This position, in my
judgment, is simply wrong.
Van Drunen’s formulation distinguishes the “civil” kingdom from the “spiritual” kingdom. The civil kingdom
…pertains to temporal, earthly, provisional matters, not matters of
ultimate and spiritual importance. For Calvin…, the civil kingdom
included matters of politics, law, and cultural life more generally. The
ends of the civil kingdom were not salvation and eternal life but a
relatively just, peaceful, and orderly existence in the present world in
which Christians live as pilgrims away from their heavenly homeland.
(24)
The spiritual kingdom
…is also ruled by God,
but he rules it not only as creator and sustainer, but also as its
redeemer in Christ. This kingdom pertains to things that are of ultimate
and spiritual importance…Insofar as this spiritual kingdom has earthly
existence, Calvin believed it must be found in the church and not in the
state or other temporal institutions. (24)
Van Drunen says,
Although necessarily existing together and having some mutual
interaction in this world, these two kingdoms enjoy a great measure of
independence so that each can pursue the unique work entrusted to it.
(24)
Van Drunen finds this doctrine in some of the church
fathers, medieval theologians, Luther and Calvin. The attribution of a
two kingdoms doctrine to Calvin is controversial, but I shall not enter
the debate here.[6] My purpose is to focus on Van Drunen’s exegetical argument.
The distinction Van Drunen tries to make between “religious” and
“civil” (let’s just say “secular”) is problematic on many levels, though
many have made this distinction an important feature of their theology.
Those who reject biblical inerrancy have often argued that the Bible is
authoritative in religious, but not secular matters. The same argument
has been made with regard to the sufficiency of Scripture.[7] Others have made a large effort to distinguish in worship between “religious” and “secular” aspects.[8]
But plainly this distinction is a theological construction. The
Bible itself never enunciates it. And outside Scripture, the definition
of “religion” is somewhat ambiguous. Let us consider some possible uses
of the term.[9] The
term can refer to truths about God, as when people distinguish the
religious from the secular content of the Bible. This usage can be broad
or narrow:
(1) Broadly, “religious” may refer to the sphere
in which God is at work. But that sphere is universal. Let us keep in
mind that God’s lordship over the universe is comprehensive. It is not
over one area as opposed to another. Everything is what it is because of
its relation to God. So God is sovereign over everything that happens
in the world, since he has created all things and “works all things
according to his will” (Eph. 1:11). Not only does God forgive human sin,
but he directs the course of nature, counts the hairs on our heads,
sees the sparrow fall. Heaven is his throne, the earth his footstool
(Isa. 66:1).
(2) A narrower understanding of God’s
“religious” activities identifies religion with what God does to restore
fallen people to fellowship with him. This seems to be what Van Drunen
identifies as the religious “realm.”[10] But
that sphere, too, is universal. God’s choice of people for salvation
begins before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1:3-6). And Rom. 8:28
says that “for those who love God all things work together for good.”
Salvation is a cosmic event (Rom. 8:19-23, Col. 1:15-20) in which God
deals, not only with sin, with Satan, with the evil angels, and with the
curse on creation brought about by sin. To be sure, not all people are
saved. But everything that happens in nature and history is part of the
story of salvation.
(3) “Religion” can also refer to a set of
human duties. Broadly, the term can refer to our fundamental obligation
to glorify God. But that too is universal. God’s command in Gen. 1:28
is relevant to all of human life. Whether we eat or drink or whatever we
do, we should be doing it to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10:31). This
broad understanding of human religion corresponds to the universal
extent of God’s sovereignty I discussed under (1).
(4) When
Van Drunen speaks of human religious duties, he takes them more narrowly
than (3). Corresponding somewhat to (2), he takes the term as referring
to a certainclass of human duties, namely those
arising out of our redemption from sin. These would include, I presume,
repentance, faith, taking the sacraments, participation in the church,
obeying the Great Commission, etc. In Van Drunen’s view, these duties
are “religious” as opposed to the duties connected with politics, the
arts, science, or general culture. He seems to think these religious
duties are only for Christians. But in fact these obligations are
universal as well. All people at all times are obligated to believe in
Christ and to trust his provision for sin. All people are obligated,
therefore, to be Christians. Therefore they are obligated to receive the
sacraments, to worship, and to make disciples of all nations. That
includes living according to biblical morality. So even on this attempt
to define “religion” narrowly, it is impossible to make it less than a
universal obligation, or to distinguish some area of human obligation
that is not religious. Everyone is obligated to believe in Christ and to
love as he loved us (John 13:34-35).
Further, it is evident
from Scripture that “religious” issues, even in sense (4), intrude into
politics and culture. Evil rulers are people who idolize the state, who
build cities to their own glory and not to God’s (Gen. 11:4). The evil
cities of Sodom, Gomorrah, Tyre, Sidon, Capernaum and Bethsaida are
those that refuse to worship the true God and honor his law.
If that is true, then it is impossible to define a “realm” that is
exclusively religious or nonreligious. There is one realm, the creation,
the realm in which God works all things according to his sovereign will
and demands that we serve him in all aspects of our lives.
But let us listen to Van Drunen’s attempt to define a secular realm:
Fundamental to this [two kingdoms--JF] doctrine is that fact that
while God, in the progress of redemptive history, would choose out of
the world a people of his very own, he has also preserved a common,
cultural realm in which those who love him and those who do not must
live and work together. It is this common realm, consisting of both
believers and unbelievers, that constitutes the civil kingdom. (26)
I agree that God intends for believers and unbelievers to live and
work together on the earth until the final judgment. And since
unbelievers have no part in the church or the people of God, the area in
which believers and unbelievers work together is distinct from the
church. God enables this common effort to take place by his “common” or
non-saving grace. But Scripture never calls this common area a realm or
kingdom, as Van Drunen’s two kingdom view does.
The “area of
common grace” exists because part of the human race, after the Fall,
refused God’s offer of redemptive grace in Gen. 3:15. After Cain killed
his brother Abel, he “went away from the presence of the Lord” (4:16)
and created a civilization in his own honor, a city named after his own
son (Gen. 4:17). The people in this society fell deeper and deeper into
sin (Gen. 4-6). God’s end-verdict was,
…the wickedness of man
was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his
heart was only evil continually. (Gen. 6:5)
The existence of
a Cainite society, separate from the people of God (4:26) was an evil.
Van Drunen, by calling this society a “realm,” intends to confer some
sort of legitimacy on it. But the development of societies in opposition
to God is, according to Scripture, profoundly illegitimate.
This is not to say that everything in Cainite culture was bad. God
authorized protection of Cain following his murder of Abel (4:15), and
that was a good thing. Music (4:21) and metalworking (4:22) are
certainly good activities. But these activities should have been done to
the glory of God, within the family of God.
Clearly it is
wrong to say that God authorizes or approves the development of culture
antagonistic to him, or even culture that claims neutrality. There is no
neutrality, as Cornelius Van Til constantly emphasized. Everything we
do is either for the glory of God or it is not (1 Cor. 10:31). It either
comes from the wisdom of God or the wisdom of the world, and these are
antagonistic to one another (1 Cor. 1:20-21). Unbelieving culture
exists, and it exists by God’s decree and permission, but not by his
precept. He does not approve it.
Van Drunen never considers
this sort of argument, and this omission greatly weakens his case for
the two kingdoms view. He seems to think that natural law is sufficient
to generate societies of sweet reasonableness and peace. Scripture’s
view is very different.
God’s Covenant with Noah
But we should follow his argument further. He says that the civil
realm receives its institutional foundation, in effect, in God’s
covenant with Noah (following the flood) in Genesis 9. Van Drunen
understands this covenant to be a “covenant of common grace” (27). That
is, the covenant is made with the whole human race, indeed every
creature, “whether devout or not.” He adds,
Furthermore,
Genesis 9 makes it evident that the covenant of common grace regulates
temporal, cultural affairs rather than more narrowly religious affairs
pertaining to salvation from sin. (27-28)
He concludes,
God has established the civil kingdom in the sinful world, a common
realm constituted of all people, whatever their religious commitment, in
which temporal affairs of justice, procreation, and cultural
development are regulated. These affairs are a common enterprise. (28)
In my view, Van Drunen’s treatment of Gen. 9 (based to be sure on
that of Meredith G. Kline) reads far too much into the passage. God’s
covenant here is, to be sure, a covenant with all human beings. But at
the time, “all human beings” consisted of one family, a believing
family, who had embraced God’s promise of deliverance through the ark.
There is no specific reference in the passage to unbelievers, or to a
secular state, or to “temporal affairs,” or to some system of social
organization beyond the family.
Noah’s family was a godly
family, every bit as much as was Abraham’s later on. The blessing of
preservation given to Noah’s family is a gracious promise, which they
received by faith. In Chapter 8:20-22 Noah offers a sacrifice to God,
and God’s promise to preserve the earth is a response to the sweet
aroma. Was this sacrificial ritual anything other than religious?
Indeed, God’s covenant with Noah is religious through and through,
even on the narrowest definitions of “religion.” In the New Testament,
the flood is a type of God’s final judgment on sin (Matt. 24:37-39, Heb.
11:7, 1 Pet. 3:20, 2 Pet. 2:5, 3:5-6), and also of the baptism of
believers (1 Pet. 3:21). Noah is for us a model of saving faith. By
constructing an ark, “he condemned the world and became an heir of the
righteousness that comes by faith” (Heb 11:7). God’s promise to Noah is
an encouragement to believers that the apparent delay of Jesus’ return
is part of God’s redemptive plan (2 Pet. 3:4-13).
No doubt
that as time progresses the promise also benefits nonbelievers. In that
sense it is common grace. For that matter, all of God’s covenants bring
blessing to the world in general. Believers are the salt of the earth
and the light of the world (Matt. 5:13-16). God’s bringing the elect to
repentance delays the judgment on the wicked and thereby benefits them
(2 Pet. 3:9).
But God’s covenant with Noah is an
administration of God’s redemptive grace, religious through and through,
just as those with Abraham, Moses, David, and Christ.
God’s Covenant with Abraham
As we have seen, Van Drunen regards God’s covenant with Noah as a
covenant of common grace, dealing only with secular or “civil” matters,
not spiritual ones. I have tried to show this is an erroneous way of
understanding that covenant. Similarly, I think Van Drunen errs when he
interprets God’s covenant with Abraham as a covenant dealing only with
“religious, redemptive affairs” (29).
He points out that in
the Abrahamic covenant, “God ratified his covenant promises with a
sacrificial ritual” (29), referring to Gen. 15:12-21. But as I indicated
earlier, the same was true in the Noachic covenant (Gen. 8:20-22).
Van Drunen adds that the sign of the Abrahamic covenant,
circumcision, “symbolized salvation through the shedding of blood,”
presumably in contrast with the rainbow as the sign of the Noachic. But
as we saw, the rainbow symbolized the postponement of final judgment
until the full number of the elect are brought to repentance. The two
signs seem to me to be equally religious.
And Van Drunen
stresses that the Abrahamic covenant is particularistic: not dealing
with all people, but separating one family from the others. But the
promise of 12:3 shows that this separation has a universal purpose, that
all families of the earth will be blessed. Van Drunen emphasizes that
this blessing is only for believing families, not for all human beings.
However (1) Noah’s covenant also brings ultimate blessing only to
believers, those who survive the judgment. And (2) as with the Noachic
covenant, the Abrahamic brings blessings on unbelievers in the time
before the final judgment. This fact is clear in the stories Van Drunen
cites about Abraham’s relations with local kings and tribes, and from
the principle I noted earlier: that the presence of believers in society
brings many benefits to unbelievers.
Van Drunen insists that in those encounters between Abraham and the larger society he is
…religiously separate from the world but culturally engaged with the
world. When it came to life in society, the civil kingdom, Abraham
lived according to the idea of commonality established in the Noachic
covenant of common grace. When it came to his religious life and eternal
hope in the spiritual kingdom, Abraham lived according to the idea of
particularity established in the covenant of grace. (29-30).
Here Van Drunen takes for granted his earlier interpretation of the
Noachic Covenant, which I countered earlier. But even granting that,
what does Van Drunen mean by “living according to the idea of
commonality established in the Noachic Covenant” as distinguished from
“living according to the idea of particularity?” Van Drunen described
the Noachic Covenant as “secular” and “civil.” But he did not indicate
anything in the Noachic covenant that required a particular way of life.
And in fact there is nothing of that sort in the Noachic covenant. Gen.
9 authorizes Noah to eat meat, to punish violence and murder, and to be
fruitful and multiply. In my view, these precepts (except possibly the
first) antedated the Noachic Covenant. In any case, the covenant does
not establish anything like a secular, civil, or “commonality”
lifestyle.
Further, it is odd to suggest that the
particularity of the Abrahamic covenant is somehow in tension with
Abraham’s cooperation with people outside the covenant. Van Drunen knows
this, but he seems to think that such cooperation requires a
nonreligious covenant principle of some sort. on the contrary, God’s
redemptive revelation teaches believers precisely to live at peace with
all men (Heb. 12:14) and to recognize the authority of rulers regardless
of their religion (Rom. 13:1-7).
God’s Covenant With Israel Under Moses
In the time of the Israelite theocracy, Van Drunen says,
Instead of mingling with unbelieving nations in cultural endeavors,
God’s people were now commanded to exterminate the pagans within the
nation’s borders (e.g., Deut. 7:1-5). The principle of commonality in
cultural matters that was established in the Noachic covenant was set
aside here. (30-31)
Certainly there are times in which
peaceful cooperation is the rule, and other times in which the
antithesis between belief and unbelief comes to the fore. These times,
however, are determined by God’s supernatural revelation, not by general
“principles” of commonality or antithesis. For one thing, the
antithesis between Israel and the Canaanite nations is not simply an
antithesis between belief and unbelief. Israel is to exterminate the
nations occupying the land, but it is not to exterminate non-Israelite
“sojourners” that pass through. Indeed, the law protects sojourners (Ex.
12:49, Lev. 19:33, Num. 9:14). The purpose of the conquest is to remove
unbelieving culture, so that it may not tempt Israelites to be
unfaithful to God. It is not to kill all individual unbelievers just
because they are unbelievers, because they deserve God’s judgment. In
that respect, the conquest is not a type of God’s eschatological judgment, though in many other ways it is an apt illustration of it.
So Israel’s conquest of Canaan is not well described as a “setting
aside” of a “principle of commonality.” As we have seen, there was no
principle of commonality enunciated in the Noachic covenant. And
peaceful coexistence with unbelievers is generally characteristic of
redemptive covenants, except when God says otherwise.
This
observation is relevant to Van Drunen’s larger thesis about natural law.
The believer’s relation to unbelievers is ultimately governed by God’s
supernatural revelation, not natural law. Natural law is incapable of
making the distinctions needed. In this case, it is incapable of telling
us that believers should peacefully coexist with unbelievers in
situation A, but not in situation B.
So the situations Van
Drunen mentions in which David, Solomon, and others coexist with pagan
kings and appreciate their cultures do not require a two kingdoms view
of things. There is one kingdom, and God our king tells us when, where,
how, and how much to participate in pagan culture.
The New Covenant Under Christ
Van Drunen says that under the New Covenant the “principle of
commonality” prevails (32-35). Certainly Jesus and the Apostles do not
call believers to conquer unbelievers with the sword
as Israel conquered Canaan.[11] Rather,
they call us to be subject to the rulers the world ( Rom. 13:1) and to
respect prevailing customs, except where these entail sin (1 Cor.
10:27-30, etc.). But again, as with previous covenants, the distinctive
standards of the new covenant are given by supernatural revelation. They
are not the result of some theological extrapolation of general
principles such as “religious” vs. “secular.”
Natural Law in the Civil Kingdom
After distinguishing the spiritual from the civil kingdoms, Van
Drunen proceeds to argue the role of natural law in each of these
spheres. Since I have rejected the spiritual/civil distinction, I will
not be able to endorse Van Drunen’s conclusions in these sections.
Van Drunen argues that “in a certain sense, Scripture is not the
appropriate moral standard for the civil kingdom” (38). Why? He argues,
Biblical morality is characterized by an indicative-imperative
structure. That is, all of its imperatives (moral commands) are
proceeded (sic) by and grounded in indicatives
(statements of fact), either explicitly or implicitly. The most
important indicative that grounds the imperatives in Scripture is that
the recipients of Scripture are the covenant people, that is, members of
the community of the covenant of grace. (39)
Since
membership in the civil kingdom is not limited to believers, the
imperatives of Scripture do not bind members of that kingdom. These
imperatives are not “directly applicable to non-Christians” (40).
To respond: The indicative-imperative structure is not the only
ground of ethics in Scripture, nor the most ultimate one. The ultimate
ground is the character of God, in whose image we are made (as Van
Drunen indicated on 12-14). We are to be holy as he is holy (Lev.
11:44-45, 1 Pet. 1:15-16, compare Matt. 5:48).
The next
highest ground of morality is the creation ordinances that God gave to
Adam and Eve before the fall: labor, marriage, Sabbath. These bind
people as people, not as members of any redemptive covenant.[12] I
believe that the Decalogue is largely a republication of creation
ordinances applied to Israel’s situation as they approached the land of
promise.
If by “ground” we mean “motivation for ethical behavior,”[13] then
Van Drunen is correct to call our attention to God’s redemptive acts as
grounding our obedience, e.g., “If then you have been raised with
Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated at the
right hand of God” (Col. 3:1). But there are other motivations. one is
simply the fact that God has commanded us to do something, e.g. “Have I
not commanded you? Be strong and courageous” (Josh. 1:9). Another (also
in Josh. 1:9) is God’s promise to accompany us when we obey: “for the
LORD your God is with you wherever you go.” Compare Matt. 28:20, where
Jesus promises to be with his disciples as they make disciples in all
nations.[14]
Are any of these grounds or motivations available to unbelievers? Yes and no. Unbelievers as well as believers ought to
appeal to the character of God and to the creation ordinances, because
they are human beings. Unbelievers have no right, as unbelievers, to
appeal to God’s redemptive acts and presence; but they ought to become
believers, so that they can make this appeal. Given that condition,
unbelievers as well as believers should make their ethical decisions
based on God’s redemptive acts, his commands, and his presence. The
whole Bible, in other words, is God’s standard for all people, believers
and unbelievers alike. God has not ordained separate ethics for
believers and unbelievers. All human beings are subject to the same
standard and ought to be motivated in the same way.
Following
his discussion of ethical standard and ground, Van Drunen counsels us
to limit our expectations for the civil kingdom. He says, “This
perspective gives us no reason to expect the attainment of paradise on
earth” (40). This is somehow related to the fact (41) that “life in the
present world is one of suffering and hardship and that true peace and
justice is attained only in the age to come.” Certainly Scripture tells
us that believers must endure suffering in this world, and the texts Van
Drunen mentions are to the point.
But I don’t quite
understand what that has to do with the two kingdom theory, or the
nature of the civil kingdom, or natural law, or the ground of ethical
obligation. Nobody to my knowledge argues that it is possible to attain
paradise on earth.[15] And
whether one holds Van Drunen’s view of the two kingdoms, or mine, or
some other’s has little to do with the amount of suffering on earth one
expects to encounter. I suspect that Van Drunen is importing an
eschatological position into the book at this point, amillennialism, for
which he has not laid biblical groundwork in the book. In my own view,
there is both suffering and blessing for believers in the present world
(though no “paradise on earth”). The actual balance between these is
best seen in Mark 10:29-31.
Following this parenthesis, Van
Drunen presents three biblical ideas that seem to him to indicate an
important role for natural law in the civil kingdom. The first is
entitled “Things That Should Not Be Done” (42). This refers to the
ethical perception of the pagan king Abimelech in his controversy with
Abraham in Gen. 20. Abimelech tells Abraham that Abraham has done things
that should not be done. Similarly the pagan king in confrontation with
Jacob in Gen. 34:7. These pagan kings do not appeal to Scripture texts,
but to something like a natural order.
As indicated earlier,
I do not question Van Drunen’s assertion that there is such a thing as
natural law, that pagans can know important truths apart from Scripture.
However, (a) I do think here as earlier that Van Drunen gives too
little attention to the possibility that this knowledge is linked to
God’s creation ordinances transmitted from generation to generation. But
I readily agree that some ethical knowledge may be innate and some is
gained from the creation itself (Rom. 1:20). (b) I do not agree that
this natural knowledge bears some special relation to a “civil kingdom”
that is nonreligious.[16] There is no indication of such a context in Gen. 20 and 34 and certainly not in Rom. 1.
The second idea Van Drunen mentions is “The Fear of God” (45-49).
Van Drunen claims that this phrase reveals a nonreligious civil
morality. But the phrase itself, in which God’s name appears, raises a
large presumption against such an interpretation. Van Drunen admits at
points in this discussion that his understanding is tentative. The
phrase often occurs in Scripture to indicate “the most sincere and
genuine piety,” as Van Drunen admits (46). I don’t doubt that the phrase
can be used in other ways and may indicate a more general sense of
accountability to God. But certainly it is not a nonreligious or secular
ｅxpression. Most likely it is based on a tradition passed down from
ancestors who were true believers. Van Drunen’s attempt to secularize it
is not persuasive at all.
The third principle that Van
Drunen ascribes to natural law in the civil kingdom is “a common
humanity” (49-54). Here he mentions people outside the redemptive
covenants such as Job, who believed that he “could not treat (his
servants) in just any way he wished” (50). Van Drunen gives other
examples of this principle, but I don’t find in any of them evidence of a
civil or nonreligious morality. The passage Van Drunen quotes from Job
is this one:
If I have rejected the cause of my manservant or
my maidservant, when they brought a complaint against me, what then
shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer
him? Did not he who made me in the womb make him? And did not one
fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15)
But this moral sentiment is profoundly theistic. To call it nonreligious is to my mind absurd.[17]
It is also strange (and the strangeness pertains to all three of Van
Drunen’s examples) that Van Drunen makes no reference to the
unbelievers’ suppression of the truth that Paul describes so clearly in
Rom. 1:18-32. Van Drunen mentions that earlier in the book (17), but in
these discussions of the positive value of natural law he seems to have
forgotten it entirely. Surely one can’t give an adequate account of the
value of natural law, to say nothing of the nature of our “common
humanity,” without any reference to the unbeliever’s suppression of the
truth. I would not say that this suppression contradicts everything Van
Drunen has said about the positive value of natural law. In Paul’s
discussion, the natural law does provide a standard of conduct and
leaves people without excuse. The sinner cannot suppress the truth so
completely that it has no influence on him. Van Drunen might have
developed his view of natural law by analyzing this paradox, the
combination of truth and falsity in the sinner’s mentality. That would
have been a valuable discussion. Unfortunately he chose instead to
ignore the whole issue and to treat natural law as a straightforward,
practical revelation about all things secular.
Natural Law in the Spiritual Kingdom
In the last major section of the book, Van Drunen seeks to show
how natural law operates within the spiritual kingdom—that is, how it is
relevant for believers. In the first section, “Natural Law and the
Renewal of the Image of God,” he argues that since redemption renews us
in the image of God, and since he has earlier correlated the image of
God with natural law, therefore, “The present, earthly existence of the
spiritual kingdom cannot be at odds with that good creation and its
natural law; it far transcends them” (57). This is formulated rather
vaguely. I guess Van Drunen is saying that natural law tells us about
the earthly creation we are to transcend through redemption, and that
that knowledge is somehow valuable. I’m not sure I understand his point.
In “Biblical Ethics and the Natural World,” Van Drunen mentions
analogies between nature and morality, particularly in the wisdom
literature. Prov. 26:1 says, “Like snow in summer or rain in harvest,
honor is not fitting for a fool” (58). There are other correlations
between human and animal behavior, etc. I have no objections to any of
this. In fact, I find it amusing and edifying. But I find nothing here
to validate Van Drunen’s two kingdom focus. Precisely the same points
can be made by people who think there is only one kingdom. These
references to nature merely show the vast extent of the single kingdom
in which God rules.
Same for “Biblical Ethics and the Ethics
of the World,” where Van Drunen mentions implicit and explicit biblical
commendations of pagan morality. He mentions, indeed, the possible
dependence of biblical laws and wisdom sayings on those from pagan
lands. Again, I see nothing here to contest, except that again he
ignores the suppression of the truth among these pagan sages. And there
is nothing here that verifies Van Drunen’s general theses about the two
kingdoms.
It is interesting, though, that when he cites
biblical dependence on pagan morality, he contradicts what he said
earlier. Recall that on p. 39 he argued that in Scripture the ground of
morality is the indicatives of God’s saving acts. There he intended to
contrast Scripture with natural law, to show that Scripture is not a
proper standard for the civil kingdom. But here he says that Scripture
appeals to pagan wisdom, even natural law itself. These appeals are not
appeals to God’s redemptive acts. Indeed, they refute the idea that
Scripture and natural law are radically different in their grounding and
motivations.
Conclusion
To repeat, I am convinced that there is such a thing as natural
law. But I am not at all convinced of Van Drunen’s (or anyone else’s)
distinction between religious and secular kingdoms, and I do not see any
reason to limit the use of Scripture to the religious kingdom as Van
Drunen suggests. Scripture is God’s word, and God’s word is the
foundation of morality. When we want to draw people, believers or
unbelievers, to that foundation, we should be unashamed to refer to
Scripture. I grant that there are many cultural forces telling us not to
refer to Scripture in the public square. But we should not listen to
them. The attempt of Van Drunen and others to convince us not to apply
Scripture to civil matters is a failure.[18]
I do not deny the importance of other distinctions that are
sometimes related to these. I am not saying, for example, that church
and state are identical. The distinction between these is evident: in
brief, the church does not bear the sword, and the state does not
administer the sacraments. Nor is there any need to turn our cultural
activities into churches, as by restricting our art to gospel tracts.
But good art will be art that recognizes the comprehensive lordship of
Jesus Christ. That doesn’t imply that there are distinctively Christian
and non-Christian brush strokes. It does imply that a Christian artist
should not be mistaken for a secular nihilist, or Muslim, or new-age
Monist. But given these distinctions, we should confess that culture is
Jesus’ culture. To paraphrase Kuyper, as Jesus looks at our culture, he
will always say, “Mine!!”
But the distinction between church
and state, or Christ and culture, cannot be helpfully understood by the
two kingdoms scheme. Civil culture and redemption are both under God’s
sovereignty, and under the authority of his infallible word.
And natural law itself is profoundly religious. That is perfectly
evident from Rom. 1:18-32, arguably the fundamental text on natural law.
There, natural law gives a clear knowledge of God—not just morality,
certainly not some secular civil morality—but God himself. Natural law
clearly reveals God’s own nature and attributes (verse 20). It even
leads to a personal knowledge of God: not just knowing facts about him,
but knowing him (verse 20). The suppression of natural law leads to
idolatry (21-25), perhaps the most religious of all sins. That idolatry
leads in turn to sexual (26-27) and every other kind of sin (28-31). To
call this morality “secular” or “merely civil” profoundly misses its
intent.
As a treatment of natural law itself, apart from the
two-kingdoms construction, Van Drunen’s book ignores the most important
issues: (a) The unbeliever’s suppression of the truth of natural law,
which Van Drunen mentions on p. 17 and then ignores through the rest of
the book. He never struggles with the problem of how natural law can
function as a practical standard of human life, when people inevitably
suppress the truth in unrighteousness.
(b) The difficulty of arguing ethical
issues from natural law. People often say that it is difficult to argue
ethical issues from Scripture in a society that does not honor
Scripture’s authority. But it is even more difficult to argue from
natural law. For natural law is not a written text. Even though it is
objectively valid, there is no way of gaining public agreement as to
what it says as long as we simply exchange opinions about what natural
law says. For example, when people argue from natural law that abortion
is wrong, they are essentially pitting their intuitions against the
intuitions of others (intuitions which, when true, are often
suppressed). Often such arguments are naturalistic fallacies, arguments
from “is” to “ought:’ e.g., unborn children are genetically unique
organisms, therefore we ought not to kill them. Arguments from Scripture
are not problematic in this way.
And (c), granted that
supernatural revelation is compatible with natural law in a two-kingdoms
context, is there any sense in which supernatural revelation,
Scripture, issufficient for God’s glory and for our faith and life? Van Drunen gives us no reason to think that it is.
[1] Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.6.
[2] I
believe the last clause, “that binds morally…” is intended to describe
the moral order = natural law, rather than its nearest antecedent
(“supernatural divine revelation”). I think that to make this clear Van
Drunen should have put a comma after “revelation.” Or, better, he should
have put a period after “revelation,” then written “This moral order
binds…”
[3] I
usually prefer to speak of ”natural revelation” rather than “natural
law,” to avoid some of the problematics I shall discuss in this review.
But I agree that natural revelation contains moral content (as, e.g., in
Rom. 1:32), so the phrase “natural law” can be used appropriately. I
will use it in this review to accommodate Van Drunen’s terminology.
[4] In a footnote on 14, he does qualify his account by saying that this natural law does not give “exhaustive moral
guidance.” But the lacuna in natural law is not filled by supernatural
revelation. It is rather filled by human freedom: “It is probably best
to say that natural law provides a general framework in which the moral
life should be lived, but that royal image-bearers have a significant
degree of freedom within that framework to exercise dominion over the
earth in ways appropriate in different contexts.” I agree with Van
Drunen that God’s law (whether supernatural or natural) allows such
scope for free choice. Not every action is commanded or prohibited. But I
still have found nothing in Van Drunen’s account about the place of
supernatural revelation in the life of our unfallen first parents.
[5] I
disagree with his view that Gen. 9:6 is concerned with “a system of
civil justice” (16). But that issue will come up more appropriately at a
later point.
[6] For
some who have taken issue with Van Drunen here, see Jason Lief, “Is
Neo-Calvinism Calvinist? A Neo-Calvinist Engagement of Calvin’s ‘Two
Kingdoms’ Doctrine,” Pro Rege 27.3 (Mar., 2009), 1-12.
Van Drunen has also argued the very implausible position that Abraham
Kuyper held a two kingdoms view, in “Abraham Kuyper and the Reformed
Natural Law and Two Kingdoms Tradition.” Calvin Theological Journal 42
(2007): 283-307. But to the contrary see Timothy P. Palmer, “The
Two-Kingdom Doctrine: A Comparative Study of Martin Luther and Abraham
Kuyper,” Pro Rege 27.3 (Mar., 2009), 13-25.
[7] I have responded to this view of the sufficiency of Scripture in my Doctrine of the Christian Life (Phillipsburg: P&R, 2008), 156-75.
[8] In
Reformed discussions over the “regulative principle of worship,” this
is the distinction between “elements” (religious) and “circumstances”
(nonreligious). But on this see ibid., 464-481, especially 472-3.
[9] I
ignore the use of “religion” by Karl Barth and some others, to
designate human self-righteousness. I think that is a misuse of a
perfectly good word.
[10] So
far as I can tell, Van Drunen never defines the religious, or the
secular either, though he does attempt to define the religious and
secular realms in a rough sort of way. But his failure
to define religious and secular makes his definitions of the respective
realms problematic. In attributing definitions to him here, I am
extrapolating inductively from what he says about the realms.
[11] There is a spiritual warfare, though, and that is not merely a metaphor. See, e.g., Eph. 6:10-20.
[12] I
cannot take time to discuss this in detail, but I am perplexed that Van
Drunen’s book says nothing about the creation ordinances. For one
thing, much of what we call “natural law” may well be based on oral and
written transmission of creation ordinances to all nations, in which
case natural law is the product of supernatural revelation. Van Drunen
should have addressed this possibility, as a challenge to his own
understanding of natural law. In any case, the existence of creation
ordinances reinforces the picture I have presented, that God never
intended us to make moral decisions apart from his spoken words to us.
[13] Van Drunen should have clarified the meaning of the term ground, since he gives such weight to the idea.
[14] For more on ethical grounds and motivations, see Doctrine of the Christian Life, 19-37, 131-382.
[15] Postmillennialists
believe that believers over many years can bring about a
widely-dispersed saving knowledge of God together with some measure of
earthly prosperity. But even they generally distinguish that prosperity
from that of Heaven and from the New Heavens and New Earth.
[16] The
phrase “some special relation” indicates my unclarity as to just how
Van Drunen understands their relation to a “civil kingdom” in these
passages.
[17] Further,
there is no indication here that Job gained this moral insight from
nature rather than from a tradition of supernatural revelation.
[18] There
may, to be sure, be times and places where reference to Scripture texts
is rhetorically counterproductive. It may even be desirable at those
times to make use of arguments commonly associated with natural law. But
we must be clear that whatever our rhetoric, our purpose must be to
bring nothing less than the standards of Scripture to bear on society. |
